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October 2008
DUELING NATURES
by
Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II
Strategic Studies Institute
Election cycles make for interesting times. For one thing, they prompt debates
among defense analysts and other experts over current programs, the balance (or lack
thereof) among ends, ways, and means, as well as examinations of some of the basic
assumptions underpinning our theories and concepts of war. One debate in particular—
that regarding the nature of war—is worth reviewing because its implications are farreaching.
For most of its history, the nature of war was not a contested concept. Military
professionals believed that war’s nature was unchanging: war was violent, chaotic, and
tended to escalate beyond control. For that reason, it seemed a good idea to strike
“firstest with the mostest.” The basic idea was to knock the other guy off balance and to
keep hammering him until he succumbed. It was supremely frustrating to all but a few
military commanders that their political masters could not understand this most simple
of rules, dictated—so it seemed—by the nature of war itself.
That general understanding changed with the various waves of thinking that struck
in the 1990s with the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs.” One school of thought
in particular became popular when it claimed that information technologies could
change the very nature of war by reducing or eliminating uncertainty, at least for one
party. With the “fog of war” essentially lifted—and the enemy’s forces and movements
revealed and thus rendered vulnerable—war would become a one-sided affair, a
genuinely reliable and low-risk political tool. These claims immediately brought a series
of counterclaims, which argued that the nature of war could not be changed by the
introduction of a mere piece or two of technology, however revolutionary.
The resultant controversy revealed two things: (1) the U.S. military did not have a
clear understanding of the nature of war, let alone a uniform one; and (2) the
disagreement had implications for the services. Airpower enthusiasts held firmly to the
former view, that information technologies were radically changing not only the
conduct of war but its very essence; while landpower and seapower advocates argued
for the permanence or “unchangeability” of war’s nature, and the need for reliable
reserves as a hedge against uncertainty. If war did indeed become a one-sided affair,

large reserves would not be necessary, and force structures could be cut back
accordingly.
Uncharacteristic of debates of this sort, this one reached a conceptual middle-ground
relatively quickly. The idea of the nature of war was examined more closely, and in
near-Clausewitzian fashion, it was divided in two: one part consisted of war’s “nature,”
or essence, which was considered to remain unchanging, while the other part was made
up of war’s “character,” or how it is fought, which was seen to change frequently based
on the weapons and techniques employed. Information technologies might change the
character of war, so the argument went, but they could not change its nature. How
could war’s nature change? If it did, it would not be war anymore.
This middle ground seemed acceptable for a time. Proponents of the new school of
thought could still claim that a military revolution was underway, even if it involved
war’s character rather than its nature. At the same time, the other side could continue to
argue that war’s nature had not changed, and therefore it was still wise to hedge one’s
bets in war.
The problem is that the conceptual middle ground was illusory: English dictionaries
do not allow for a meaningful distinction between the terms “nature” and “character.”
Each term could well be substituted for the other without a significant loss in meaning.
However, there is a second problem which has to do with the logic underpinning
the argument that war’s nature is unchanging. If war’s nature is unchanging, then we
should be able to draw the following conclusions:
• All wars must follow the same pattern, whatever that may be; they may be
different in minor details but nothing more.
• What holds true for one will hold true for all: if one war escalates, they all must
escalate, without exception.
• We should be able to predict outcomes: the same key factors should appear again
and again as responsible for victory (or defeat).
• It should be possible to discern a set of rules or principles that would pertain to
all wars.
Few scholars or military professionals today would want to accept these conclusions, regardless of which side of the debate they are on. Even those who believe the
nature of war is unchanging would readily agree that war is fundamentally a clash of
opposing wills. That alone means it must be dynamic. That, in turn, means it must
fluctuate and change in intensity, that is, be changeable, rather than static. Ergo, the
logic for arguing that war’s nature is unchanging is broken at a critical point.
But there is a way to resolve this problem. What those who argue that war’s nature
is unchanging appear to want to say is that there are certain elements or tendencies
common to every war, be they the Clausewitzian tendencies of hostility, chance, and
purpose, or some other elements. Because they are found in every war, they are
described as “permanent,” and, by extension, war’s nature is described as “unchanging,” even though the tendencies themselves do fluctuate, sometimes wildly. No single
technology or technological innovation can eliminate that. In this sense, their argument
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is laudably Clausewitzian. Its obvious sin is that it is unhappily awkward: war has an
unchanging nature that is itself changeable.
Clausewitz did indeed say that all wars are things of the same nature, but we need
to remember that nature is essentially Janus-faced, with all-out wars on one side and
very limited ones on the other. It is a nature comprised of three principal tendencies—
hostility, chance, and purpose—which operate along a sliding scale of intensity. We also
need to remember that he said war is more than a chameleon: a chameleon can only
change its external colors, but not its internal composition (its organs remain fixed).
War, in contrast, can change the proportional relationships among any or all of its three
tendencies and still remain war. Clausewitz underscores war’s changeable nature to
make the point that military “grammar” might need to be revised, depending upon
which face of Janus is leering at us.
As for those who argue that the fog of war can be lifted, thereby permanently
altering the nature of war—what they are actually saying is that war’s nature does not
matter: whatever it is, we can change it and make war what we want it to be, preferably
short and essentially risk-free. They are putting all their faith in a certain type of
technology and taking an enormous leap. They are asking us to leave our reason behind
and join them. We have seen this before, and the landings are always messy and
painful. I, for one, will take my chances with the sin of unhappy awkwardness.
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